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The character of a developing country’s exchange rate regime 
can heavily influence both its domestic monetary stability and its trade 
competitiveness. But conventional wisdom assumes a trade-off between these 
two objectives. Hence, policymakers are usually advised to choose either a fixed 
exchange rate (in order to maintain price stability) or a fully flexible exchange 
rate (in order to maintain international competitiveness). 
This Development Viewpoint argues, in contrast, that an intermediate exchange 
rate regime is generally preferable for developing countries because it can 
achieve some degree of both stability and flexibility. In support of such an 
option, this Viewpoint presents illustrative evidence from Brazil’s recent 
experience (see Kaltenbrunner and Nissanke 2009).
Intermediate regimes could take a range of forms: a discretionary adjustable 
pegged regime, a target band system or a rule-based ‘crawling peg’, all of which 
could satisfy the need for both flexibility and stability. For example, adjusting the 
exchange rate within a band could help absorb unanticipated shocks, whether 
real or monetary, and thereby provide some degree of flexibility for domestic 
monetary policy. Maintaining the exchange rate within the band could also 
provide an anchor for price stability by demonstrating a degree of monetary 
discipline. 
Here, we present the case specifically for a moving target band regime known as 
the BBC regime, which combines elements of a ‘basket’ [of currencies], a ‘band’ 
and ‘crawling’, so that both the central reference rate and the width of the band 
are adjusted in light of changing macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Establishing Credibility
Under financial globalisation, a centrally important policy issue is how a central 
bank’s commitment to an intermediate exchange-rate regime could be regarded 
as ‘credible’ by market participants and serve the bank’s policy objectives. In the 
early 2000s, the chief argument against intermediate regimes was that they were 
no longer viable under the conditions of free capital mobility. Unavoidably, such 
regimes were vulnerable, it was argued, to speculative attacks on the currency. 
Hence, many developing countries were counselled to move towards either 
‘hard pegs’, such as monetary unions, or a floating exchange rate combined 
with inflation-targeting monetary policy. It was assumed that credible inflation 
targeting by central banks would ensure monetary stability without having to 
rely on exchange rate-based stabilization. 
However, there is a third perfectly viable option, we would argue. This option 
could combine a ‘half-independent’ monetary policy with a ‘half-fixed’ exchange 
rate, namely, some form of intermediate regime. Such a choice would be even 
more viable, and thus become more credible, if policymakers adopted some 
degree of management of capital inflows and outflows. 
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that as a result of the devastating 
consequences of financial crises and remaining structural weaknesses, such as 
domestic agents’  borrowing in foreign currencies, policymakers in developing 
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countries still fear the exchange-rate instability inherent in having a fully flexible regime. 
Consequently, many countries have continued managing their exchange rates. But, in 
the absence of capital controls, they have had to amass a large stockpile of international 
reserves in order to safeguard their currency against speculative attack.
Hence, it is important that when policymakers are considering the appropriate regime, 
they understand the forces that cause speculative attacks. For example, the advocates 
of fully market-determined exchange rates treat currency traders and speculators as 
rational agents who are assumed to keep the exchange rate in line with macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Hence, such advocates believe that managing the exchange rate would 
only distort the currency market. 
‘Noise’ Traders
But we believe that currency traders can usefully be divided into two major groups: 
informed traders, who make rational decisions on currency values, and what could be 
called ‘noise’ traders, who make decisions based on ‘fads’ unrelated to any underlying 
economic factors determining the exchange rate. 
While volatility of an exchange rate could, indeed, be due to changes in fundamental 
factors, such as the structure of a country’s trade, not infrequently it could also be 
attributed to the growing influence of ‘noise’ traders, who follow ‘herd instincts’ based on 
short-term trends and their motivation for quick profits. 
Often the influence of ‘noise’ traders has become decisive when an exchanger rate is 
observed to move further and further away from any value related to fundamental factors. 
As ‘noise’ traders increase their speculation on a currency, its volatility is exacerbated. This 
creates, in turn, greater opportunities for capitalising on risk premiums, attracting even 
more ‘noise’ traders into the market. A speculative bubble emerges and becomes self-
reinforcing.
We believe, however, that the influence of ‘noise’ traders and the associated impact of 
subjective factors in determining an exchange rate can be curbed by the appropriate 
choice of exchange-rate regime. Intervention by the central bank to manage the exchange 
rate could, for example, stabilize market expectations and limit exchange-rate variability. 
Indeed, a stabilized exchange rate might even change the structure of the market itself, 
as destabilising ‘noise’ traders--unable to reap any short-term gains--are driven out of the 
market. 
Brazil’s Exchange Rate Regimes
In order to test such hypotheses, we examine the effect of Brazil’s choice of exchange 
rate regime on the dynamics of its exchange rate. Given the difficulty of identifying and 
quantifying underlying exchange-rate fundamentals, our tests are limited to investigating 
the time series properties and variability of the Brazilian Real.
The following graph shows the behaviour of the Brazilian exchange rate from March 1995, 
when the crawling band regime was introduced, until mid July 2007, well after a floating 
regime had been introduced. In response to a speculative attack on its currency, Brazil 
switched in early 1999 from managing its Real within a narrow band to allowing a freely 
floating exchange rate combined with strict domestic inflation targeting. 
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As can be seen from the graph, the floating exchange rate regime has been 
characterised by substantial volatility. After a period of depreciation until 
the beginning of 2003, fuelled by a political crisis and concerns about Brazil’s 
capacity to repay its external debt, the exchange rate was subject to a trend of 
appreciation. This was due to an improving current account, but also speculative 
capital inflows capitalizing on the sustained exchange rate appreciation and very 
high domestic real interest rates. A series of statistical tests that we conducted 
corroborate the above observations. 
In order to test for the presence of noise trading under the floating exchange 
rate regime, we have assumed such trading to have the characteristic of simple 
positive feedback. Such feedback should exhibit itself in periodic positive 
serial correlation in exchange rate returns (in which currency values tend to be 
correlated with their preceding values). Our results suggest that the floating 
exchange rate regime has been subject to multiple equilibria, in which periods 
of no serial correlation alternate with periods of significant positive correlation in 
returns. 
Also, it is important to note that while serial correlation is positive during the 
floating exchange rate regime, it is negative during the managed exchange 
rate regime. This finding tends to support the hypothesis of a contrast between 
destabilising ‘noise’  trading under the floating regime (in which the rate moves
 progressively away, for a while, from an ‘equilibrium’ value) and the ‘mean-
reverting’ behaviour of the rate under the target zones of the managed regime. 
It is important to stress, however, that the trends cited above provide only 
suggestive, not conclusive, evidence of the increased or decreased importance of 
‘noise’  traders. Other factors, such as intervention by the central bank, could have 
been at work, for example. In our future empirical work, we plan to conduct tests 
of such factors and hope to incorporate macroeconomic fundamentals into our 
analysis. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, we believe that the suggestive evidence 
of high volatility and multiple equilibria under the Brazilian floating exchange 
rate regime and more stabilizing, ‘mean-reverting’ behaviour under the managed 
exchange rate regime supports our basic argument that managed regimes 
should be the preferred option for most emerging-market economies. One of the 
advantages of such regimes  is that they tend to stabilize exchange rate dynamics 
through altering the expectations and behaviour of participants in the exchange 
rate market.  
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